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I. Introduction
“Subtle and insubstantial, the expert leaves no trace; divinely mysterious, he is inaudible. Thus he is master of his enemy’s fate.” 1
In the theater of war, the “Internet Age” has shifted the
scenery. The advent and global expansion of this new medium
may prove to be the fastest and most powerful technological
revolution in humanity’s history.2 It has created a global atmosphere in flux, “characterized by interdependence, uncertainty, complexity, and continual change.”3 Because cyberspace passes electronically through geopolitical and natural
boundaries, electronic payloads ‘launched’ into cyberspace enjoy instantaneous deployment.4 Moreover, the threats posed by
world conflicts in cyberspace are an imminent reality; with the
advent of “the internet of things,” hackers can remotely control
connected devices, including motor vehicles traveling at full
speed.5 It is plausible that a state or group engaged in a cyber
SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 97 (Samuel B. Griffith trans., 1971).
See Nils Melzer, Cyberwarfare and International Law 3 (UNIDIR Resources 2011), http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/cyberwarfare-andinternational-law-382.pdf (“[T]he advent and global expansion of the Internet
may prove to become the fastest and most powerful technological revolution
in the history of mankind.”).
3 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE
OPERATIONS 1 (2006).
4 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 5.
5 See Mark Pesce, The Internet of things is great until it blows up your
house,
THE
REGISTER
(Apr.
17,
2015),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/17/the_internet_of_things_is_great_unti
l_it_blows_up_your_house/ (noting that with 33 billion connected devices projected by 2020, a hacked connected device can be problematic, because “33
billion connected devices means 33 billion attack surfaces, each with their
own exploits, zero day attacks, weaknesses and vulnerabilities.”); see also
Andy Greenberg, Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—With Me in
it, WIRED (Jul. 21, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackersremotely-kill-jeep-highway/ (reporting on a test performed by hackers near
St. Louis on a motor vehicle traveling at 70 m.p.h.: “As the two hackers remotely toyed with the air-conditioning, radio, and windshield wipers, I mentally congratulated myself on my courage under pressure. That’s when they
cut the transmission.”). Some experts suggest that any number of otherwise
benign devices are susceptible to hacking. See, e.g., Brian Wheeler, Toys
1
2
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conflict could remotely light up tens of thousands of ovens or
furnaces in a military base or an urban center, effectively destroying a target without firing a missile or mobilizing a warplane.6 In now-declassified documents, the United States military has characterized a new dimension in warfare: “The
Cyberspace Domain,” which may likely extend into outer
space.7 The U.S. military defines this domain as
“[c]haracterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures.”8
A recently suggested definition of a “cyber-attack” refers to
it as “[a]ny action taken to undermine the functions of a computer network for a political or national security purpose.”9
The definition is hardly a settled one, however; many States
and scholars have defined “cyber-attack” more broadly or narrowly.10
could be used as spying devices, MPs told, BBC News (Dec. 9, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-35043521 (noting experts’ concerns
about “smart toys” given that “anything that connected to the internet could
‘in theory’ be hacked into,” including driverless cars or household appliances).
6 See Pesce, supra note 5 (noting that “when you go away on a fortnight’s
holidays, and someone hacks into your oven, turns the gas on, waits 36 hours,
then lights the pilot, well, then you’ve got a problem. A much worse problem
if you happen to be at home at the time. Your oven could gas you in your
sleep.”).
7 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 3 (positing the existence of the “Cyberspace Domain”); Chris Bowlby, Could a war in space really happen?, BBC
NEWS (Dec. 19, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35130478 (noting
that “[c]yber attacks on military satellites are another concern” and that
“[t]here are now more incentives for a potential adversary, such as China, to
attack satellites or disable them as part of a conventional conflict … they
know full well that space capabilities are at the core of the US's ability to project power.”).
8 Id.
9 Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV.
817, 826 (2012).
10 See, e.g., Reese Nguyen, Comment, Navigating Jus Ad Bellum in the
Age of Cyber Warfare, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1079, 1088 (2013) (“rather than defining ‘cyber attack’ by the object of attack, it makes more sense to define the
term by the instrument of attack. Under this reading, the term ‘cyber attack’
may describe the use of cyber operations as a weapon or form of attack, with
the word ‘cyber’ characterizing the mode of assault. Just as an ‘air assault’
denotes a military attack using aircraft, or as an ‘amphibious assault’ denotes
an assault by land and sea executed on a hostile shore, a ‘cyber attack’ can
denote an attack executed by means of a computer or computer network.
Here, a cyber attack is an instrument or method of attack, a weapon or capa-
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While “the notion of ‘armed attack’ necessarily implies the
use of a weapon,”11 the members of armed forces seldom effectuate cyber-attacks exclusively in cyber operations.12 In October of 2014, hackers thought to be working for the Russian
government breached White House computer networks, resulting in temporary service disruptions.13 Earlier in 2014, a group
using the moniker “Lizard Squad” launched a series of denialof-service attacks against the Vatican and several online gaming sites;14 their acts culminated in the ‘tweeting’ of a false
bomb threat, resulting in the diversion of American Airlines
Flight 362, traveling from Dallas to San Diego.15 Shortly
thereafter, the group claimed that it took its actions in support

bility that is used to effectuate a particular objective.”); Phillip Pool, War of
the Cyber World: The Law of Cyber Warfare, 47 INT’L LAW. 299, 309 (2013)
(noting the broad definition proffered in the Shanghai Cooperation, an
agreement signed by Russia, China, and other central Asian countries, defining cyber warfare more expansively by including “information war,” meaning
a “mass psychological brainwashing to destabilize society and state, as well
as to force the state to take decisions in the interest of an opposing party.”);
Erki Kodar, Applying the Law of Armed Conflict to Cyber Attacks: From the
Martens Clause to Additional Protocol I, 15 ENDC PROCEEDINGS 107, 107-08
(2012),
http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wpcontent/uploads/2012/12/KVUOA_Toimetised_15_5_Kodar.pdf (noting the
U.S. Department of Defense’s narrower definition, “actions taken through the
use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy information
resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and the
networks themselves.”).
11 Melzer, supra note 2, at 13.
12 Kodar, supra note 10, at 124.
13 Ellen Nakashima, Hackers breach some White House computers,
WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/hackers-breach-some-white-house-computers/2014/10/28/2ddf2fa05ef7-11e4-91f75d89b5e8c251_story.html?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_t
erm=*Morning%20Brief&utm_campaign=2014_MorningBrief%20RD%20PROMO10.29.14 (noting, in addition, a previous operation termed
“Buckshot Yankee,” allegedly perpetrated by the Russian intelligence service, that breached U.S. military classified networks in 2008).
14 Alyssa Newcomb, Lizard Squad: Who Is the Group Claiming Responsibility for High Profile Hacks? ABC NEWS (Aug. 26, 2014, 1:38 PM),
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/lizard-squad-group-claiming-responsibilityhigh-profile-hacks/story?id=25129458.
15 Hayley Tsukayama, Sony says no customer information was taken in
online
attack,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
25,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/08/25/sony-saysno-customer-information-was-taken-in-online-attack/.
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of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS or ISIL).16 While
any direct relationship between Lizard Squad and ISIL is highly unlikely,17 their attack is not the only one to have planted
the ISIL flag in cyberspace. In February of 2015, a group declaring support for ISIL jihadists hacked Newsweek’s twitter
account, releasing several military documents claimed to be of
a classified nature.18 Notably, ISIL regularly utilizes online
platforms to recruit fighters,19 and over time, cyber operations
by the group or its supporters have gotten bolder. In 2015, a
dedicated cyber unit identifying as the “CyberCaliphate”
hacked the Twitter account of the United States Central Command.20 Another group, the “ISIS Cyber Army,” targeted fiftyone American websites, defacing them with the ISIL flag.21
In December of 2014, the North Korean government
16 Lizard Squad (@Lizard Squad), TWITTER, (Aug. 24, 2014, 8:03 AM),
https://twitter.com/LizardSquad/status/503558145784815619 (last visited
Aug. 27, 2014, 7:01 pm) (“Today we planted the ISIS flag on @Sony’s servers
#ISIS #jihad”) (Twitter has since suspended this particular Lizard Squad Account).
17 See Nakashima, supra note 13 (noting, while unable to confirm Russia’s responsibility for the attack, that sources suggested “the nature of the
target is consistent with a state-sponsored campaign.”); Tsukayama, supra
note 15 (noting that “there was no official information” on whether a substantiated connection between Lizard Squad and ISIS existed). However, at least
some Lizard Squad members likely have anti-western leanings in tandem
with those espoused by ISIS. See Neha Singh, US officials start probe as
hackers claim leaking data about FBI employees, ibtimes.co.in (Feb. 9, 2016
16:06 PM IST), http://m.ibtimes.co.in/us-officials-start-probe-hackers-claimleaking-data-about-fbi-employees-666286 (noting that a former member of
Lizard Squad is reported to have had involvement in the leaking of some
29,000 FBI and DHS employees’ personal information; reporting also that
“before allegedly hacking into the data of FBI and DHS employees, the hackers tweeted, ‘When will the US government reali[z]e we won't stop until they
cut relations with Israel.’”).
18 Newsweek is latest victim of the ‘Cybercaliphate’, I24 NEWS (Feb. 10,
2015: 9:45 PM), http://www.i24news.tv/en/news/technology/60697-150210newsweek-is-latest-victim-of-the-cybercaliphate.
19 See, e.g., ISIS recruits fighters through powerful online campaign,
CBS NEWS (Aug. 29, 2014: 6:55 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-usessocial-media-to-recruit-western-allies/.
20 Michael Martinez, Cyberwar: CyberCaliphate targets U.S. military
spouses; Anonymous hits ISIS, CNN (last updated Feb. 11, 2015, 7:50 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/10/us/isis-cybercaliphate-attacks-cyber-battles/.
21 ISIS Cyber Unit Announces More Hacks, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE
BLOG (Mar. 26, 2015), http://blog.adl.org/international/isis-cyber-unitannounces-more-hacks.
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matched these groups’ opening salvo tenfold by hacking into
Sony Pictures’ networks as retaliation for the film company’s
intended release of The Interview,22 a film depicting the killing
of the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.23 The rogue state’s
hackers damaged Sony Pictures’ network infrastructure so badly that Sony workers had to revert to using fax machines to
communicate.24 The White House’s speedy attribution of the
Sony Pictures hack to agents of the North Korean government
was only possible due to metadata and other evidence gathered
by the United States government beginning in 2010, when the
National Security Agency used “early warning radar” software
to monitor North Korea’s activities.25 The devastating effect on
Sony Pictures from that relatively crude attack led the company’s CEO to describe the hack as “the worst cyberattack in U.S.
history.”26 While that claim may be dubious given the shortcomings of Sony’s own network and the international standard
for a cyber-attack, the operation was unprecedented in that a
sovereign state leveraged the attack in order to achieve a very
non-cyber aim, namely, the cancellation of a film release.27 In
response to this and other attacks like it in recent years, the
Obama Administration announced the creation of a new agency, the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC),
modeled on the National Counterterrorism Center, at the Wilson Center in Washington.28
THE INTERVIEW (Sony Pictures 2014).
Michael Cieply, ‘The Interview’ Brings In $15 Million on Web, N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
28,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/29/business/media/the-interview-comes-toitunes-store.html.
24 Aarti Shahani, Is Sony Hack Really ‘The Worst’ In U.S. History, As
CEO
Claims?
NPR.ORG
(Dec.
23,
2014,
5:05
AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/12/23/372603286/is-sonyhack-really-the-worst-in-u-s-history-as-ceo-claims.
25 David E. Sanger & Martin Fackler, N.S.A. Breached North Korean
Networks Before Sony Attack, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/world/asia/nsa-tapped-into-north-koreannetworks-before-sony-attack-officials-say.html.
26 Shahani, supra note 24.
27 Roy Isacowitz, Despite all the publicity, the Sony hack was small-time;
much worse is yet to come, HAARETZ (Dec. 25, 2014, 8:24 PM),
http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/.premium-1.633813.
28 Obama administration announces new cybersecurity agency, FOX NEWS
(Feb.
10,
2015),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/02/10/obama22
23
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Regardless of whether victims or independent observers
successfully identify the source of a cyber-attack, the effects of
such an attack are pervasive, insidious, and borderless. Those
that perpetrate cyber-attacks may do so from virtually anywhere with Internet access, and may reach to virtually anywhere with Internet access. Belligerent states increasingly
employ private contractors and civilian employees in a variety
of functions, including cyber operations roles.29 In such an environment, where the ‘fog of war’ pervades every bit and byte of
the virtual battlefield, the international community must revisit the definition of ‘combatant’ as applied to cyber-attacks if it
wishes to ensure continued global peace and security.
Cyber-attacks take many forms, only some of which are
applicable to the law of war.30 This Comment discusses only
those attacks sponsored by a government or non-state entity
that have the goal of affecting morale or gaining political advantage, or those attacks amounting to tactical strikes on state
or civilian infrastructure. In that vein, this Comment proposes
the adoption of a new legal framework for determining the
threshold that marks a participant in such a cyber-attack as a
“cyber-combatant” by adapting the framework set by the Geneva Conventions and existing custom. This definition should
encompass cyber-attacks perpetrated by states, unrecognized
states, and non-state groups. It should set the rules of engagement for cyber-attacks and operations conducted for political advantage, morale boost, and tactical purposes.
Whether they act on the orders or in support of States or
non-state groups, those perpetrating cyber-attacks that have
material effects upon the morale or infrastructure of a sovereign nation during armed conflict should be treated as “combatants” for purposes of international law, and the legality of
administration-to-announce-new-cybersecurity-agency/.
29 Melzer, supra note 2, at 34.
30 See id. at 22 (“[S]ecurity threats emanating from cyberspace which do
not reach the threshold of armed conflict can be described as ‘cyber crime’,
‘cyber operations,’ ‘cyber policing’ or, where appropriate, as ‘cyberterrorism’
or ‘cyber piracy’, but should not be referred to with terminology inviting
doubt and uncertainty as to the applicability of the law of armed conflict.”).
This Comment will approach issues of attacks related to cyber-warfare and,
to a lesser extent, cyber-terrorism, as applied to legal issues in direct relation
to international humanitarian law.
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their actions should be defined. Because the standard governing what constitutes a lawful combatant under any reasonable
reading of the Geneva Conventions31 is muddled as applied to
combatants in cyber-warfare as presently conducted, this paper
takes the position that under present custom, cybercombatants may likely be effectively considered illegal combatants under International Law.
Part II of this Comment provides a framework for defining
“cyber-combatants,” reviewing the traditionally accepted definition of “combatants” under the Geneva Conventions and customary international law as restated through the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare.32
Part III explores the alleged cyber-operations of sovereign
States, including Israel’s C4i Cyber Warfare Unit and The
United States’ USCYBERCOM and its sister agencies, some or
all of which may have been responsible for the Stuxnet attack
on Iran; Russia’s coordinated cyber-attacks perpetrated during
its war with Georgia in 2008 and in the conflict in Ukraine in
2014 and 2015; and China’s PLA Unit 61398. Part IV introduces the unique problem posed by cyber-attacks perpetrated
by agents of unrecognized states and organized terrorist groups
such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. Finally, Part V concludes by proposing alternative definitions for cyber-attacks, and consequentially, cyber-combatants.
II. The present status of the Law of Cyber-Warfare

31 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, (entered into
force Feb. 2, 1956) 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, (entered into force Feb. 2, 1956) 6 U.S.T 3217, T.I.A.S.
No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, (entered into force Feb. 2, 1956) 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75
U.N.T.S. 135, https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/375?OpenDocument [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, (entered into force Feb. 2,
1956) 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth
Geneva Convention].
32 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt, ed., 2013).
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International treaty and custom governing cyber-warfare
are in a state of evolution.33 At present, broad international
dialogue on the interpretation and application of existing rules
and principles of international law to cyber-warfare are virtually non-existent.34 The activities that would define the nature
and character of ‘cyber-combatants’ thus find their definition in
existing international humanitarian law (jus in bello), which
“sets forth the rules of the game; the rules under which hostilities can be carried out.”35 These rules derive primarily from the
Hague Convention of 1907,36 the four Geneva Conventions of
1949,37 and the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions
of 1977.38 These treaties, and the custom derived from them,
supply the predominant body of provisions related to jus in bello.39
Because the Third Geneva Convention is now widely accepted as customary international law,40 it defines the playing
33 See generally Bradley Raboin, Corresponding Evolution: International
Law and the Emergence of Cyber Warfare, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L.
JUDICIARY 602 (2011).
34 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 4.
35 Thomas Michael McDonnell, Sow What You Reap? Using Predator
and Reaper Drones to Carry Out Assassinations or Targeted Killings of Suspected Islamic Terrorists, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 243, 270 (2012).
36 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land
(Hague Convention (IV)), Annex, art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No.
539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations], https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/195.
37 See generally supra note 31.
38 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter A.P. I]; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter A.P. II].
39 See McDonnell, supra note 35, at 270; ICRC, What Is International
Humanitarian
Law?,
at
1
(July
2004),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf.
40 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 31 (encompassing 196 State
Parties); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting, at that
time, that the four Geneva Conventions “have been ratified by more than 180
nations, including the United States.”); see also Press Release, ICRC, Geneva
Conventions of 1949 achieve universal acceptance, ICRC Press Release 06/96,
(Aug. 21, 2006), (acknowledging that “[t]he recent accessions by the Republic
of Nauru and the Republic of Montenegro to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,” resulting in the universal acceptance of the conventions, and remind-
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field for States in armed conflict involving two or more States.41
Article 4 of that Convention defines “combatants” as follows:
1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well
as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such
forces.
2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer
corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside
their own territory, even if this territory is occupied provided
that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:
a. that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
b. that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance;
c.

that of carrying arms openly;

d. that of conducting their operations in accordance with
the laws and customs of war.
3. Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a
government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining
Power . . .”42

The Third Geneva Convention imposed these conditions as
requirements for “militias and corps of volunteers not forming
part of the regular armed forces, thus solving one of the most
difficult questions—that of ‘partisans.’43 The drafting history of
ing “all belligerents of their obligation to abide by the laws of war”); Mike
Sanderson, The Syrian Crisis and the Principle of Non-Refoulement, 89 INT’L
L. STUD. 776, 796 (2013) (stating that “all four conventions are now widely
accepted to have passed in their entirety into customary international law”);
INTERNATIONAL LAW 814-16 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 3d ed. 2010); Partial
Award on Prisoners of War, Eritrea’s Claim (Eri. v. Eth.) 42 I.L.M. 1056,
1083 (Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm’n 2003).
41 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 31, art. 2.
42 Id. at art. 4.
43 See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary, III Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, 60
(Jean Pictet, ed., 1960) [hereinafter Commentary on Third Geneva Convention] (noting that the drafters of Article 4 codified it to resolve the issue posed
by partisan fighters: “During the Second World War, certain States refused to
recognize as belligerents combatant units which professed allegiance to a
Government or authority which these States did not recognize.”).
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the Convention further reveals the flexibility inherent in each
of the requirements.44 Section (a), which requires the condition
of command, did not necessarily require a military officer to fill
the role; the individual asserting command could be a civilian,
though his competence would be assessed in the same way as
that of a military commander.45 The drafting history on Section (b), which requires “a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at
a distance,” specifies that its distinctive nature requires that
“the sign must be the same for all the members of any one resistance organization, and must be used only by that organization,” but is more nebulous with respect to the issue of recognizance at a distance, leaving it “open to interpretation.”46
Likewise, the language “carrying arms openly” in Section (c)
acknowledged that the arms need not be visible and could take
many forms.47 Finally, the term “the laws and customs of war”
in Section (d) was purposely kept vague by the Convention’s
drafters.48 It is apparent from the flexibility of these terms
that the drafters’ intent was to allow for renewed teleological
interpretation of the Geneva Conventions, because advances in
technology and socio-political norms would necessarily change
the nature and dynamics of the battlefield.49
See id. at 59-61.
Id. at 59.
46 Id. at 60; see also TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE, supra note 32, at 99 (noting conflict as to
what would meet the standard of a ‘fixed distinctive sign’ in cyber warfare;
some experts noted that “the requirement only applies in circumstances in
which the failure to have a fixed distinctive sign might reasonably cause an
attacker to be unable to distinguish between civilians and combatants, thus
placing civilians at greater risk of mistaken attack”).
47 Commentary on Third Geneva Convention, supra note 43, at 61 (noting that “openly” does not mean “visibly” or “ostensibly,” as “[s]urprise is a
factor in any war operation . . .” In regards to weaponry, noting that “[t]he
enemy must be able to recognize partisans as combatants in the same way as
members of regular armed forces, whatever their weapons.”).
48 Id. (noting that “[T]he concept of the laws and customs of war is rather vague and subject to variation as the forms of war evolve.”).
49 See Neil McDonald & Scott Sullivan, Rational Interpretation in Irrational Times: The Third Geneva Convention and the “War on Terror”, 44
HARV. INT’L L.J. 301, 306 (2003) (advocating a teleological approach to the
Third Geneva Convention in light of its drafting history: “[b]ecause such narrowing language was rejected, application of the provisions should be read
broadly.”); id. at 303 (“[A] state’s freedom of interpretation within the Geneva
Convention treaty regime is relatively broad, but is subject to general assent
44
45
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With the flexibility of a teleological approach in mind, it is
worthwhile to review emerging custom in the law of cyberwarfare. Because of its comprehensive nature, it is worthwhile
to begin such a survey through the lens of NATO’s Tallinn
Manual on the International Law of Cyber Warfare.50 The
rules proffered in the Tallinn Manual “reflect consensus
among . . . Experts as to the applicable lex lata, that is, the law
currently governing cyber conflict.”51 The international legal
scholars who published the Tallinn Manual did so to address
concerns similar to those of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance
to the Geneva Conventions; in applying International Law to
the Information Age, these scholars noted that many international customs developed prior to the advent of the computer. 52
Due to their intended status as an attempted ‘restatement’ of
current custom in both the jus ad bellum and jus in bello of
cyber warfare, however, the rules in the Tallinn Manual do not
proffer to “set forth lex ferenda, best practice, or preferred policy.”53 Thus, while it acknowledges that “the scope and manner
of international law’s applicability to cyber operations . . . has
remained unsettled since their advent,”54 and that “publicly
available expressions of opinio juris” surrounding the issue
“are sparse,”55 the Tallinn Manual may nevertheless provide as
valuable an insight as any into the evolving custom that currently governs ‘the Law of Cyber-War.’56
from the international community, which may hinge on considerations of
both international law and politics.”); Orna Ben-Naftali & Sean S.
Gleichgevitch, Missing in Legal Action: Lebanese Hostages in Israel, 41 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 185, 248 (2000) (advocating for a teleological approach to the Third
Geneva Convention in the context of Lebanese guerilla combatants; arguing
that the complementary nature of the Geneva Conventions “indicates the
primary purpose of the Laws of War: to ensure that all people, combatants
and civilians alike, who find themselves involved in an armed conflict, are not
bereft of status and the protection their status bestows.”).
50 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE, supra note 32.
51 Id. at 5.
52 See Collin Allan, Note, Direct Participation in Hostilities from Cyberspace, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 173, 175 (2013).
53 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 5.
54 Id. at 3.
55 Id. at 5.
56 See Manny Halberstam, Note, Hacking Back: Reevaluating the Legali-
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Rule 30 of the Tallinn Manual defines a “Cyber Attack” as
“a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage
or destruction to objects.”57 Note 2 accompanying the definition
narrows it, stating that “[n]on-violent operation, such as psychological cyber operations or cyber espionage, do not qualify as
attacks.”58 Note 3 specifies further that generally, in determining whether a cyber operation is an ‘attack,’ the consequences
of the operation are material to the determination; the nature
of the operation, however, is not.59 Note 8 further suggests
that some attacks that do not cause any physical damage may
constitute ‘cyber attacks’ under Rule 30 in narrow circumstances:
Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I [to the Geneva Conventions]
prohibits ‘acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which
is to spread terror among the civilian population.’ Since terror is
a psychological condition resulting in mental suffering, inclusion
of such suffering in this Rule is supportable through analogy. 60

In addition, intercepted attacks nevertheless qualify as
‘cyber attacks’ under the Rule “if, absent such defenses, it
would have been likely to cause the requisite consequences.”61
Thus, a cyber attack need not be successful to be classified as
such.
ty of Retaliatory Cyberattacks, 46 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 199, 205 n. 42
(2013) (noting that “[a]lthough the manual is not binding, its influence as a
persuasive secondary source will be substantial.”); Harry P. Koulos, Note, Attacked by Our Own Government: Does the War Powers Resolution or the Law
of Armed Conflict Limit Cyber Strikes Against Social Media Companies?, 11
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 705, 736 (2013) (acknowledging the existing difficulty
in definitively concluding the existence of customary norms in cyber warfare,
yet adamant that “the Tallinn Manual Experts were unanimous in their conclusion that the current law of armed conflict applies to cyber operations.”);
see also Michael N. Schmitt, International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh
Speech and Tallinn Manual Juxtaposed, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 13, 15-16 (2012)
(noting that the United States has taken “precisely the same position” as the
Tallinn Manual on the applicability of the law of armed conflict to cyber operations).
57 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 106.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 107.
60 Id. at 108.
61 Id. at 110.
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Rule 5 declares a State’s responsibility for cyber infrastructure located within its territory or under its exclusive governmental control.62 Rule 7 clarifies, however, that attribution
of an attack to a State may not be predicated upon “[t]he mere
fact” that a cyber operation’s place of launch or origination is
within “governmental cyber infrastructure.”63 Presumably,
once an attack meets this high threshold required for proper
attribution, Rule 9 permits the State injured by the intentionally wrongful act of another state to resort to “proportionate
countermeasures, including cyber countermeasures, against
the responsible State.”64 As in the Law of War from which it
derives,65 countermeasures taken in self-defense are “not limited to a State’s own territory.”66
Rule 20 provides that “[c]yber operations executed in the
context of an armed conflict are subject to the law of armed
conflict.”67 The characterization of either “hostilities” under
Rule 22 or “protracted armed violence” under Rule 23 “. . . may
include or be limited to cyber operations,” as an international
armed conflict.68 In addition, such characterization may apply
in a non-international armed conflict.69 Under Note 16 to Rule
22, “so long as the armed and international criteria have been
met, an international armed conflict exists.”70 As regards a
non-international armed conflict under Rule 23, Note 11 states
that “[f]or a non-international armed conflict to exist, there
must be at least one non-State organized armed group involved
TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 26.
63 Id. at 34.
64 Id. at 36.
65 See U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defen[s]e if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”).
66 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 36.
67 Id. at 75.
68 Id. at 79; see also id. at 84 (explaining, at cmt. 15, that “The International Group of Experts unanimously concluded that cyber operations alone
might have the potential to cross the threshold of international armed conflict.”).
69 Id. at 84.
70 Id.
62
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in the hostilities. Such a group is ‘armed’ if it has the capacity
of undertaking cyber attacks” under Rule 30.71 This standard
appears to operate under a broad canon of construction, as a
group’s ‘armed’ nature may be predicated solely upon its possession of computer hardware and software sufficient to render
it capable of executing a cyber-attack.72 This means that the
possession of firearms and other kinetic weaponry is not a
predicate requirement for a group to be ‘armed’ under the Tallinn Manual, which has implications with respect to Article 4,
section 2, subsection c of the Third Geneva Convention.73 Note
3 to Rule 22 notes that the question of whether the actions of a
non-state may be attributed to another state such that the conflict is international was explicitly addressed in Prosecutor v.
Tadic:
[c]ontrol by a State over subordinate armed forces or militias or
paramilitary units may be of an overall character . . . This requirement, however, does not go so far as to include the issuing of
specific orders by the state, or its direction of each individual operation. Under international law it is by no means necessary
that the controlling authorities should plan all the operations of
the units dependent on them, choose their targets, or give specific
instructions concerning the conduct of military operations and
any violations of international humanitarian law. The control
required by international law may be deemed to exist when a
State (or, in the context of an armed conflict, the Party to the
conflict) has a role in organising, coordinating or planning the
military actions of the military group, in addition to financing,
training and equipping or providing operational support to that
group.74
71 See TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 88.
72 See Steven G. Bradbury, The Developing Legal Framework for Defensive and Offensive Cyber Operations, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 591, 607 (2011)
(noting that under customary international law, “if the cyber intrusion inflicts significant physical destruction or loss of life by causing the failure of
critical infrastructure, like a dam or water supply system, then it obviously
would constitute an armed attack under the law of war and would justify a
full military response if it could be attributed to a foreign power.”).
73 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 31, at art. 4(2)(c) (“that of carrying arms openly”).
74 See TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 80, citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 137 (Appeals Chamber, ICTY, Jul. 15,
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In addition, Rule 24 holds “[c]ommanders and other superiors” to be “criminally responsible for “ordering cyber operations that constitute war crimes,”75 and “[m]ercenaries involved in cyber operations do not enjoy combatant immunity or
prisoner of war status” under Rule 28.76 These Rules clarify
that international custom contemplates attacks initiated in cyberspace by state or non-state actors, and that such attacks
have the potential to be ‘armed’ in nature.
There are further complications, however, because navigating bits and bytes in effectuating a cyber-attack can create
similar collateral consequences to dropping a bomb, but the effects are different. While the intended target of a party dropping a bomb may generally be extrapolated from the fallout
surrounding the intended target, the intent of a party making a
keystroke may have unintended consequences that are farreaching.77 The result is that the intent of the perpetrator with
respect to such unintended consequences can be less clear, particularly if the cyber-attack causes sporadic or unforeseen
damage to civilian targets.78 In such a situation, the principle
of proportionality is likely to be of significant importance in determining whether a violation of the jus in bello has resulted.79
“[P]roportionality applies to the effects of the weapons on both
noncombatants and combatants alike,” and enjoins combatants
from directly attacking life and property of noncombatants,
“although legal and moral attacks directed against proper targets may affect them.”80

1999).
75 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 91.
76 Id. at 103.
77 See William J. Bayles, The Ethics of Computer Network Attack, 31
PARAMETERS 44 (2001) (noting the far-reaching nature of cyber-attacks, and
that “the greater the connectivity (defined as both the amount of external
communications as well as the number of potential or habitual connections
the machine uses), the more likely it is that the attack will reach unintended
targets.”).
78 Cf. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(ii),
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (“intentionally
directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives” constitutes a war crime in international armed conflicts.).
79 Bayles, supra note 77.
80 Id.
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Participation in a cyber-conflict requires its own nuanced
analysis. Rule 25 notes that no category of person is barred
“from participating in cyber operations,” though “the legal consequences of participation differ, based on the nature of the
armed conflict and the category to which an individual belongs.”81 Rule 26, however, provides that members of the
armed forces who are party to an international armed conflict
“lose their entitlement to combatant immunity and prisoner of
war status” upon failure to comply with the requirements of
combatant status in cyber operations.82 It follows that the majority of the International Group of Experts who composed the
Tallinn Manual took the position under Note 6 to Rule 26 that
cyber-combatants who fail to comply with the Third Geneva
Convention in executing cyber-attacks in an international
armed conflict would lose their combatant status under the
Convention.83 If the Third Geneva Convention applies, however, that also suggests that some terms that would be ambiguous in assessing a cyber-combatant under it (such as “having a
fixed sign recognizable at a distance” and “carrying arms openly”) must have some meaning with respect to cyberspace operations—though the precise meaning remains unclear.
It is clear, however, that if an international armed conflict
exists under Rule 22, Note 16 of the Tallinn Manual, there
must necessarily be combatants participating in that conflict.
It is conceivable that a conflict solely involving cyber operations
might potentially reach international armed conflict status under Rule 22, Note 15. Thus, Notes 15 and 16, read together,
suggest that cyber units engaged in such activity may obtain
‘combatant’ status when Rule 22 is met. The question of the
perpetrators’ “lawful” status as combatants when executing a
cyber-attack presently falls to the Geneva Conventions and
81 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 95.
82 Id. at 96.
83 See id. at 97-98 (noting in addition that “[i]f a person engaged in cyber
operations during an armed conflict is a member of an organized armed
group not belonging to a party to the conflict, it does not matter if the group
and its members comply with the four criteria of combatancy. That person
will not have combatant status and therefore not be entitled to combatant
immunity or to be treated as a prisoner of war. Such a person would be an
‘unprivileged belligerent.’”).

17

6 JAKE B SHER (DO NOT DELETE)

250

PACE INT’L L. REV.

8/10/2016 9:54 AM

[Vol. XX:N

surrounding principles of international law.
III. A survey of sovereign states’ alleged cyber operations
At this time, roughly 30 nations employ offensive cyber
programs.84 Irrespective of whether the current state of customary international law considers such programs to rise to the
level of cyber-attacks, states (and groups acting on their behalf)
have assembled formidable arsenals capable of executing devastating and continuous cyber-operations in the field of cyberspace.85 Units possessing significant cyber-capabilities include
Israel’s Unit 8200 / C4i, the United States’ USCYBERCOM,
Russia’s APT28,86 and China’s PLA Unit 61398. While examples of state cyber-capabilities are certainly not limited in practice to those described herein, the states whose activities are
84 Ralph Langner, To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What
Stuxnet’s
Creators
Tried
to
Achieve
4
(Nov.
2013),
http://www.langner.com/en/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/To-kill-acentrifuge.pdf (noting that those nations include North Korea, Iran, Syria,
and Tunisia).
85 See Molly Bernhart Walker, Cyberwarfare underway ‘all of the time,’
says former NATO supreme allied commander, FIERCEGOVERNMENTIT (Oct.
13, 2014),
http://www.fiercegovernmentit.com/story/cyberwarfare-underway-all-timesays-former-nato-supreme-allied-commander/2014-10-13 (quoting Gen. Wesley S. Clark (ret.), recounting a meeting in 1994 where “a guy [at the meeting] with a handcuff on his suitcase . . . open[ed] it up and sa[id] ‘this is really, really, really secret, but we could destroy a country’s electricity grid. Yes,
without dropping a bomb’”); Adam Jourdan, China-U.S. cyber spying row
turns spotlight back on shadowy Unit 61398, REUTERS (May 20, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/20/us-cybercrime-usa-china-unitidUSBREA4J08M20140520 (quoting an analyst from Mandiant, the U.S.
cyber security firm who identified the location of PLA Unit 61398’s operations
in China, as stating the discovery was only “the tip of the iceberg:” “I believe
there’s an ongoing battle in the cyberspace. These countries are investing
large amounts in cyber units that are able to create specific malware and
have the ability to get into foreign networks and computers to steal trade secrets and intellectual properties.”).
86 See Special Report: APT28: A Window Into Russia’s Cyber Espionage
Operations?, FIREEYE 3 (2014), https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rptapt28.pdf [hereinafter FireEye APT28 Report] (stating that the APT28’s activities are “the work of a skilled team of developers and operators collecting
intelligence on defense and geopolitical issues – intelligence that would only
be useful to a government. We believe that this is an advanced persistent
threat (APT) group engaged in espionage against political and military targets including the country of Georgia, Eastern European governments and
militaries, and European security organizations since at least 2007.”).
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enumerated below have significantly shaped the cyberbattlefield.
A. Israel and Stuxnet
The base at Urim in the Negev Desert that has formed the
central node of Unit 8200’s operations remained invisible for
decades, silently intercepting phone calls and e-mails passed on
to other Israeli agencies, including the Army and the Mossad.87
Nir Lempert, a reserve colonel and former deputy commander
of Unit 8200, has outlined the unit’s recruitment policies: the
brightest teenagers in the country are hand-picked, then
trained to solve problems in multidisciplinary teams, where
they are encouraged to think outside the military model.88
In contrast to Unit 8200, Israel’s C4i Corps is a relatively
recent arrival.89 Nevertheless, it has claimed to possess farreaching capabilities on the battlefield, from disruptions to
command and control systems to more classified non-kinetic
weaponry.90 C4i is a dynamic unit, and is currently in the process of upgrading the entire IDF network, allowing for seamless communication on the battlefront.91
Nicky Hager, Israel’s Omnicient Ears, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (Sept.
2010), http://mondediplo.com/2010/09/04israelbase.
88 Matthew Kalman, Israeli military intelligence unit drives country’s hitech
boom,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
12,
2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/12/israel-military-intelligenceunit-tech-boom (“The central mission of the unit is to save lives, to prevent
terror and other attacks,” says Lempert. “We teach our people that the mission is so important that there is no possibility of failure.”).
89 Yaakov Lappin, Military Affairs: The IDF’s Secret Attack Force,
JERUSALEM POST (May 11, 2013), http://www.jpost.com/Features/FrontLines/Military-Affairs-The-silent-attack-force-312716 (quoting a senior source
within the Electronic Warfare Section of the Corps as stating “[C4i] began
small, and became large over the past decade. Now, it’s a monster . . .” and
“The government instructed us to prepare and know how to operate [Electronic Warfare] in every operational arena.”).
90 Id. (quoting the same source: “This is not a kinetic attack. The mission
is not to destroy a target, to damage, or neutralize it, but rather to disrupt.
I’m aiming at the enemy’s command and control. His management, organization and commanders are the target . . .” but also noting that some activities
are classified).
91 Yaakov Lappin, Person of the Year in the IDF:
The C4i Corps,
JERUSALEM POST (Dec. 29, 2013), http://www.jpost.com/Features/InThespotlight/Person-of-the-year-in-the-IDF-The-C4i-Corps-336472
(“The
IDF’s C4i Corps is at the heart of a dramatic technological upgrade aimed at
87
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Israeli cyber units may have participated in the creation of
the infamous worm Stuxnet.92 An early version of the attack
weapon manipulated valves on the centrifuges to increase the
pressure inside them and damage the devices as well as the enrichment process.93 The worm, which reportedly caused the
failure of roughly a fifth of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges by causing them to spin out of control,94 manipulated computer systems designed by Siemens, a German firm, infecting computers
belonging to five outside firms believed to be connected with
Iran’s nuclear program.95 All of the companies did business in
industrial control and processing, either by manufacturing
products, assembling components, or installing industrial control systems.96 While exactly how long it took Stuxnet to reach
its target after infecting these corporate machines is unclear,
between June and November of 2010, the number of centrifuges enriching uranium gas at the Natanz Nuclear Facility began
to drop significantly.97
Unlike any other virus or worm released before it, Stuxnet
caused a physical impact on tangible equipment controlled by
the computers it infected.98 While the attack by Stuxnet on
Natanz was pinpointed and specific, its tactics and technology
achieving this vision. It has seen the IDF revolutionize its capabilities in a
very short matter of time, and 2013 has been a key year for developments.”).
92 See John Markoff, A Silent Attack, but Not a Subtle One, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept.
26,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/technology/27virus.html?_r=0
(quoting
“[a] former member of the United States intelligence community” who
claimed the attack “had been the work of Israel’s equivalent of America’s National Security Agency, known as Unit 8200.”).
93 Id.
94 Michael B. Kelley, The Stuxnet Attack On Iran’s Nuclear Plant Was
‘Far More Dangerous’ Than Previously Thought, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 20, 2013),
http://www.businessinsider.com/stuxnet-was-far-more-dangerous-thanprevious-thought-2013-11.
95 Kim Zetter, An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digital Weapon, WIRED (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdownto-zero-day-stuxnet/.
96 Id.
97 Id. (noting a decrease of 328 centrifuges between June and August of
2010, and a decrease of an additional 656 centrifuges between September and
November, for a total decrease in 984 centrifuges; also noting that “although
new machines were still being installed, none of them were being fed gas.”).
98 See id.; see also Langner, supra note 84, at 4 (styling Stuxnet’s assault
on Iranian nuclear centrifuges “a cyber-physical attack”).
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are generic; the three-layer methodology used in them, consisting of the worm’s propagation through IT systems, its manipulation of Industrial Controls, and the requisite physical damage
that results from such manipulation, has strong potential for
use against other targets.99
The Stuxnet attack has accelerated the propagation of
cyber-capabilities in the Middle East region; in early March of
2012, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, publicly
announced the creation of a “Supreme Council of Cyberspace”
charged “to oversee the defense of the Islamic Republic’s computer networks and develop new ways of infiltrating or attacking the computer networks of its enemies.”100 Simultaneously,
Iran embarked on a $1 billion (USD) plan to develop technology
and hire computer experts with the goal of boosting the Islamic
Republic’s offensive and defensive cyber-warfare capabilities.101
The 0xOmar Trojan, whose designer claims to be from Saudi
Arabia,102 released the information of thousands of Israeli credit cards in January of 2012.103 While the 0xOmar worm appears to be the product of a Wahhabi group rather than a governmental directive,104 its origin is not confirmed. Moreover, it
See Langner, supra note 84, at 4.
Shane Harris, Forget China: Iran’s Hackers Are America’s Newest
Cyber
Threat,
FOREIGN
POLICY
(Feb.
18,
2014),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/18/forget-china-irans-hackers-areamericas-newest-cyber-threat/; see also Eric K. Shafa, Iran’s Emergence as a
Cyber
Power,
STRATEGIC
STUDIES
INST.
(Aug.
20,
2014),
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Iransemergence-as-cyber-power/2014/08/20.
101 Yaakov Katz, Iran embarks on $1b. cyber-warfare program,
JERUSALEM POST (Dec. 18, 2011), http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Iran-embarkson-1b-cyber-warfare-program.
102 AL ARABIYA, ‘Saudi’ hacker says Israel uncovered wrong person, vows
deeper
strikes
(Jan.
7,
2012),
http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/01/07/186810.html (reporting that
the hacker, OxOmar, “vowed to send more files and more emails, adding that
he was from Riyadh.”).
103 Yaakov Lappin, Hackers post 1000s of Israeli credit card numbers,
JERUSALEM POST (Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.jpost.com/International/Hackerspost-1000s-of-Israeli-credit-card-numbers.
104 Gianluca Mezzofiore, Anonymous Saudi Hacker OxOmar Second Attack on Israeli Credit Cards, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2012),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/anonymous-hacker-oxomar-stages-second-attackisraeli-277469 (quoting a statement posted on an Israeli sports website: “Hi,
it’s OxOmar from group-xp, largest Wahhabi hacker group of Saudi Arabia . . . “We are anonymous Saudi Arabian hackers. We decided to release
99

100
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highlights the widespread retaliatory response to Stuxnet in
the Middle East.105
B. USCYBERCOM and related U.S. Agencies
The Army divisions that would integrate into what would
ultimately become the United States Cyber Command have
their roots in the U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command (STRATCOM).106 By 1968, STRATCOM numbered some
49,000 personnel and provided “rapid, dependable, secure
communications to military and civilian users around the
world.”107 Ultimately, however, the systems managed by the
heirs to STRATCOM (U.S. Army Communications Command in
1973, replaced by U.S. Army Information Systems Command in
1984) and their ultimate rededication to strategic signal services, resulted in the decentralization and deregulation of
command, control, communications, and computer (hereinafter
C4) systems among Army Major Commands, causing serious
compatibility issues for the Army’s IT/IS equipment and support networks.108 The negative impacts resulting from this incompatibility compelled the U.S. Army to re-centralize its C4
systems starting in 2002.109
By September 2006, it became apparent that computer
network operations had begun to evolve into a larger mission
set — cyberspace operations — and the Army directed for
greater integration, coordination, and synchronization in Army
computer operations to address risks in cyberspace.110 By July
of 2008, the Army had activated its first provisional network
first part of our data about Israel.”).
105 See generally Manny Halberstam, Note, Hacking Back: Reevaluating
the Legality of Retaliatory Cyberattacks, 46 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 199
(2013).
106 Vince Breslin, Network Enterprise Command evolved from Strategic
Communications Command, ARMY COMMUNICATOR (Summer 2010),
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Network+Enterprise+Command+evolved+fro
m+Strategic+Communications. . .-a0246535606.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Establishment of U.S. Army Cyber Command, U.S. ARMY CYBER
COMMAND, http://www.arcyber.army.mil/history_arcyber.html#N1 (last visited Apr. 19, 2015).
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warfare battalion under the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).111
In June of 2009, United States Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates, commissioned the United States Cyber Command
(“USCYBERCOM”) with the stated goal “to coordinate Pentagon efforts in the emerging battlefield of cyberspace and computer-network security.”112 At the time, USCYBERCOM’s director, Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, claimed that “[the
establishment of USCYBERCOM] is not about efforts to militarize cyberspace . . . [r]ather it’s about safeguarding the integrity of our military system.”113
While it is possible that USCYBERCOM’s initial goals may
have been almost entirely defensive in nature, Iran’s development of its nuclear program may have changed those goals –
unofficially if not officially. The New York Times reported on a
covert U.S. program initiated by President George W. Bush and
handed off to his successor, Barack Obama, after Israeli officials requested to fly over Iraq to reach Iran’s nuclear plant at
Natanz.114 While 2010 saw a much subtler attack by Stuxnet
taking much of Natanz out of commission,115 both Israeli and
Id.
Thom Shanker, New Military Command for Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES.
(June
23,
2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/24/technology/24cyber.html.
113 Mike Mount, U.S. Won’t Militarize Cyberspace, Nominee Says, CNN
(Apr.
16,
2010,
12:04
PM),
http://
www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/04/16/military.cyberspace/; see also Tod Leaven & Christopher Dodge, The United States Cyber Command: International
Restrictions vs. Manifest Destiny, 12 N.C.J.L. & Tech. On. 1, 2 (2010); cf. U.S.
Cyber
Command,
U.S.
STRATEGIC
COMMAND,
http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/2/Cyber_Command/ (last visited Apr. 19,
2015) (proclaiming USCYBERCOM’s stated mission, among other elements,
is to “. . . prepare to, and, when directed, conduct full spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains, ensure
US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries.”).
114 David E. Sanger, U.S. Rejected Aid for Israeli Raid on Iranian Nuclear
Site,
N.Y.
TIMES
Jan.
10,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11/washington/11iran.html?scp=1&sq=janu
ary%202009%20sanger%20bush%20natanz&st=cse (reporting, somewhat
cryptically, that “Several details of the covert effort have been omitted from
this account, at the request of senior United States intelligence and administration officials, to avoid harming continuing operations.”).
115 See Zetter, supra note 95.
111
112
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U.S. officials proclaimed an official denial of involvement in the
Worm’s dissemination.116
The evidence pointing to U.S. involvement in Stuxnet is
circumstantial at best,117 but there is much to suggest that the
U.S. has developed strong offensive cyber-warfare capabilities.
In October of 2012, President Obama issued Presidential Policy
Directive 20, which lays out policies and procedures for “Offensive Cyber Effects Operations” (hereinafter OCEO).118 The directive places OCEO into three distinct categories: “Cyber Operations with Significant Consequences,” which require
“[s]pecific Presidential approval;”119 “Threat Response Operations,” which provide a certain degree of departmental autonomy, but require that “[t]he United States Government shall reserve use of such responses to circumstances when network
defense or law enforcement measures are insufficient or cannot
be put in place in time to mitigate the malicious cyber activity”
and cautions that “departments and agencies shall conduct . . .
responses in a manner not reasonably likely to result in significant consequences.”120 In addition, the directive cautions departments to “use the minimum action required to mitigate the

William J. Broad, John Markoff and David E. Sanger, Israeli Test on
Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2011, at A1,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html?pagew
anted=1&_r=2&hp (reporting, in spite of the U.S. and Israeli denials, that
“[b]y the accounts of a number of computer scientists, nuclear enrichment experts and former officials, the covert race to create Stuxnet was a joint project
between the Americans and the Israelis, with some help, knowing or unknowing, from the Germans and the British.”).
117 Spencer Ackerman, With Stuxnet, Did The U.S. And Israel Create a
New Cyberwar Era?, WIRED (Jan. 16, 2011),
http://www.wired.com/2011/01/with-stuxnet-did-the-u-s-and-israel-create-anew-cyberwar-era/ (acknowledging that “Stuxnet’ s origin is unknown;” subsequently stating that “[t]he Stuxnet whodunit may be solved: it appears to
be a joint U.S.-Israeli collaboration — and a cyberwarfare milestone. The
New York Times doesn’t have definitive proof, but it has fascinating circumstantial evidence . . .”).
118 Presidential Policy Directive 20, Subject: U.S. Cyber Operations Policy
(U),
(Oct.
16,
2012),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/07/obama-cyberdirective-full-text; (June 7, 2013) (directing a new cyber operations policy;
marked “Top Secret” and ordered to be declassified on Oct. 16, 2037).
119 Id. at 9.
120 Id. at 9-10.
116
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activity.”121 “Emergency Cyber Actions” are to be conducted by
either the Secretary of Defense or other department head authorized by the President, with several caveats, including that
they be conducted only when “necessary in accordance with the
United States inherent right of self-defense as recognized in international law to prevent imminent loss of life or significant
damage” and “intended to be nonlethal in purpose, action, and
consequence.”122
U.S. military officials have acknowledged cyber-espionage,
and cyber-attacks have heralded a revolutionary new era in
military operations in which the United States cannot afford to
be left behind.123 Undoubtedly, U.S. forces are developing both
the defensive and offensive capabilities necessary to build and
maintain advantages to protect its domestic and foreign interests as regards this potential new war front.
C. Russia and APT28
If Israel and the United States in fact opened the war-front
of cyber-warfare with the release of Stuxnet in 2013, it was
Russia that fired the opening salvo five years earlier. Weeks
before the attack on Georgia in 2008 began, a security researcher in Lexington, Massachusetts became aware of a
stream of data directed at Georgian government sites containing the message “win+love+in+Rusia.”124 As early as July of

Id. at 10.
Id. at 10.
123 Mike Milord, Guard activates first cyber protection team, issues new
shoulder
sleeve
insignia,
ARMY.MIL
(Oct.
20,
2014),
http://www.army.mil/article/136100/ (quoting a speech given by Army Maj.
Gen. Judd H. Lyons during a ceremony on October 7, 2014, at which The Army National Guard’s first cyber protection team received its new shoulder
sleeve insignia) (“In 1775, the ‘shot heard round the world’ signaled the start
of the American Revolutionary War . . . Today, 239 years later, we face a
world in which the first shots of the next war may be fired in cyberspace. And
unlike the shots fired in 1775, those shots may indeed be heard around the
world, in a very real sense, as systems and components thousands of miles
away are instantaneously disabled by a keystroke.”) (Lyons stated further
that) (“The billions of lines of code, massive server farms and cloud-based assets that govern our power, water, fuel, communications, transportation, and
national defense must be protected.”).
124 John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 12,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html.
121
122
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2008, internet experts across the United States observed a relentless barrage of distributed denial-of-service attacks that effectively shut down numerous Georgian servers in a prelude to
wave of attacks that followed once the war began in earnest,
originating from hosting centers controlled by Russian telecommunications firms.125 One of the first Georgian websites
that was attacked was a popular hacker forum. In perpetrating
such an attack, Russian-supported hacker “militias” appeared
to perpetrate a preemptive strike, attempting to prevent or
mitigate “returning fire” from Georgian hackers.126 These massive digital attacks drove some of the government of Georgia’s
websites offline during the Russian invasion. The attacks were
termed by many net security experts to be the first overt act of
cyber-warfare.127
Naturally, Russia denied involvement in the computerrelated attacks.128 But the repeat use of similar measures in
Russia’s conflict with Ukraine suggests that Mother Russia
protests too much.”129 With the advent of the Ukrainian conflict, dozens of computer networks in Ukraine were found to be
infected by a cyber-espionage “tool kit” called “Ouroboros,” or
Snake, which bore uncanny similarity to a system that had attacked classified systems at the Pentagon years before.130 This
Id.
David Hollis, Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008, SMALL WARS J.,
(Jan. 6, 2011), http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/639hollis.pdf.
127 See Cyber-attacks on Georgia Websites Tied to Mob, Russian Government,
L.A. TIMES: TECHNOLOGY
(Aug.
13,
2008,
6:39
PM),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2008/08/experts-debate.html; see
also Michael Gervais, Cyber-attacks and the Laws of War, 30 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 525, 579 (2012).
128 Markoff, supra note 124.
129 See William Shakespeare, The Tragedie of Hamlet, Prince of Denmarke, in THE APPLAUSE FIRST FOLIO OF SHAKESPEARE IN MODERN TYPE 742,
758 (2001) (Neil Freeman Ed.) (“The Lady doth protest too much methinks.”).
130 David E. Sanger and Steven Erlanger, Suspicion Falls on Russia as
‘Snake’ Cyberattacks Target Ukraine’s Government, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 8,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/09/world/europe/suspicion-falls-onrussia-as-snake-cyberattacks-target-ukraines-government.html?; see also
Fred Barbash, Cyberattacks on Ukraine bear Russian hallmarks, WASH. POST
(Mar.
9,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2014/03/09/the-snake-cyberrattacks-on-ukraine-said-likely-to-comefrom-russia/ (describing the predecessor program to Ouroboros, called
“Agent.Btz,” as “the most serious breach of the U.S. military’s classified com125
126
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appeared to fit with the typical Russian modus operandi: as
one senior U.S. Intelligence official noted, “[t]he usual Russian
approach would be to design something that could both conduct
surveillance and aid in an attack.”131 Ouroboros does exactly
that: By targeting the Ukrainian government with Ouroboros,
the Russians are able to effectively engage in an aggressive,
kinetic act without actually declaring war, or other countries
reacting like it is an act of war..132 “Snake” perpetrated a massive DDoS-attack on communication channels for the National
Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, the Ukrainian staterun news agency, the Ukrainian telecommunications system,
and the mobile phones of members of the Ukrainian parliament.133
The cyber-security firm FireEye has traced the Russianbacked hacker group behind the attacks in Ukraine, dubbed
APT28 (sometimes ATP28) by experts, to coordinated, sophisticated digital attacks against NATO and the European Union.134
Ultimately, APT28 planted its flag on the White House; U.S.
officials, alerted to the breach by an ally, were able to mitigate
the group’s activity, but not before the attack caused multiple
service outages to unclassified White House networks and potentially resulted in significant data theft.135 Nevertheless, no
nation or organization has managed to directly attribute
APT28 to the Russian government, much less reveal its true
name or identity. The closest anyone has gotten — publicly, at
least — is the identification of the group’s regular activity in
Moscow and St. Petersburg time zones, and the fact that its activities further Russian governmental interests.136 The level of
puter systems . . . the Pentagon . . . discovered the rogue program infecting a
classified network harboring some of the military’s most important secrets.”).
131 Sanger, supra note 130.
132 Alec Ross, Russia’s cyber weapons hit Ukraine: How to declare war
without
declaring
war,
WORLD
POST
(Mar.
10,
2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alec-ross/russias-cyber-war_b_4932475.html
133 Hillary Douglas, Cyber attackers target Ukraine’s government departments,
EXPRESS
(Mar.
9,
2014),
http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/463828/Cyber-attackers-targetUkraine-s-government-departments.
134 FireEye APT28 Report, supra note 86, at 3-5.
135 See Nakashima, supra note 13.
136 Special Report: APT28: A Window Into Russia’s Cyber Espionage Operations?, supra note 86.
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coordination APT28 exercises, however, is strikingly similar to
that of its counterparts in Israel and the United States. Even
assuming APT28 were not a Russian military unit, it is likely
that they are operating with support from the Russian government.
D. China and PLA Unit 61398
In February of 2013, Cyber Security firm Mandiant released a report identifying an “advanced persistent threat” in
cyberspace and designating that threat “APT1.”137 Mandiant
tracked APT1 down to a 130,663 square-foot compound at 208
Datong Road in Shanghai.138 China would have been no
stranger to cyber operations; “[i]n late August of 2011, a state
television documentary aired on the government-run China
Central Television [that] appeared to capture an in-progress
distributed denial of service attack by China’s military on a Falun Gong website based in Alabama.”139 Most commonly
known by its Military Unit Cover Designator, PLA Unit 61398,
APT1 is believed to have compromised 141 companies spanning
20 major industries, stealing vast amounts of intellectual property in the process.140 According to Mandiant’s report, Unit
61398 “requires its personnel to be trained in computer security and computer network operations and also requires its personnel to be proficient in the English language.”141 A 2004 notice on Zhejiang University’s website “China’s People’s
Liberation Army Unit 61398 Recruiting Graduate Students”
[zh], stated that “Unit 61398 of China’s People’s Liberation
137 APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, Mandiant 2
(2013), http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf.
138 Charles Riley, The Cybercrime Economy: China’s military denies
hacking
allegations,
CNNMONEY
(Feb.
20,
2013,
3:52
AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2013/02/20/technology/china-cyber-hackingdenial/index.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2015) (noting that a Chinese government spokesman has criticized the report as “groundless both in facts and legal basis” and “lacks technical proof” because it “relies too heavily on the
tracking of IP addresses . . . that are stolen almost everyday”).
139 See Hathaway, supra note 9, at 820 (citing Ellen Nakashima & William Wan, China’s Denials on Cyberattacks Undercut, WASH. POST, Aug. 24,
2011, at A12).
140 APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, supra note
137, at 3.
141 Id.
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Army (located in Pudong District, Shanghai) seeks to recruit
2003-class computer science graduate students.”142 According
to the NSA, “China may have the capability to remotely shut
down computer systems [belonging to] U.S. utilities, aviation
networks, and financial companies”.143
Mandiant revealed three identifiable individuals perpetrating the attacks, two of whom it identified using the same
shared infrastructure, including Fully Qualified Domain
Names (FDQNs) and IP ranges identified as belonging to
APT1.144 The first persona, “UglyGorilla”, has been active in
computer network operations since October 2004, and authors
malware used in APT1 campaigns,145 when that persona registered the first domain name system (DNS) zone attributed to
APT1 using both Shanghai and the “+86” international code in
the registrant’s information fields.146 The second, “DOTA”,
“has registered dozens of email accounts used to conduct social
engineering and spear phishing attacks in support of APT1
campaigns, us[ing] a Shanghai phone number [in] registering
th[o]se accounts.”147 The third, “SuperHard,” “discloses his location to be the Pudong New Area of Shanghai.”148 The file
names in these hackers’ own digital weaponry suggest that
English is a second language for the programmers.149 These
and other APT1 personae appear to target emerging industries

142 PLA Unit 61398 Recruitment Notice Found, CHINA DIGITAL TIMES
(Feb.
20,
2013),
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2013/02/pla-unit-61398recruitment-notice-found/ (noting that the link to the recruitment post was
available at the time the article was written. The recruitment post is no
longer available and redirects to a “not found” page as of Apr. 13, 2015).
143 Edd Gent, China could shutdown critical US infrastructure, says
NSA chief, E&T (Nov. 21, 2014), http://eandt.theiet.org/news/2014/nov/chinacyber-infrastructure.cfm.
144 APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, supra note
137, at 5.
145 Id. (noting that “UglyGorilla” publicly expressed his interest in China’s “cyber troops” in Jan. 2004).
146 Id. at 45-46.
147 Id. at 5.
148 Id.
149 APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, supra note
137, at 38 (noting language such as “No Doubt to Hack You, Writed by UglyGorilla” and “you specify service name not in Svchost\netsvcs, must be one
of following” in the malware code’s tools).
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identified in China’s “12th Five Year Plan,”150 including information technology, high-end equipment manufacturing, advanced materials, and biotechnology.151
Close to a year after Mandiant released its report, a grand
jury in the Western District of Pennsylvania “indicted five Chinese military hackers for computer hacking” and related offenses “directed at six American victims in the U.S. nuclear
power, metals, and solar products industries.”152 The indictment, which included “UglyGorilla” among its Defendants,153
accused the defendants of hacking into several corporations
with integral roles in U.S. infrastructure, including Westinghouse Electric Company, U.S. Steel, and Alcoa.154 In response,
China “summoned the U.S. ambassador in Beijing, and warned
it would retaliate if the U.S. followed through with the charges,” and suggesting that the proceedings would damage mutual
trust.155 There has been no further news since the indictment.
Nevertheless, on April 1, 2015, President Obama signed an Executive Order allowing for the freezing of all property and interests in the United States linked to computer compromise at-

Id. at 59.
See id. at 24 (noting information technology, aerospace, satellites and
telecommunications, scientific research, energy, transportation, construction
and manufacturing, and high-tech electronics among those hardest hit by
APT1); see also Stephen S. Roach, China’s 12th Five-Year Plan: Strategy vs.
Tactics,
5
(Apr.
2011),
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/China_12th_Five_Year_Plan.pdf
(noting that China’s Twelfth Five Year Plan “focuses on the development and
expansion of seven strategic emerging industries (SEIs): New-generation information technology, high-end equipment manufacturing, advanced materials, alternative-fuel cars, energy conservation and environmental protection,
alternative energy, and biotechnology.”).
152 U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military
Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization
for
Commercial
Advantage
(May
19,
2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyberespionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor.
153 Indictment,
United States v. Dong (2014) (No. 14-118),
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/5122014519132358461949.pdf (currently under seal) (designating “UglyGorilla” as the alias for “Wang Dong”).
154 Id. at ¶ 6.
155 Adam Jourdan, China-U.S. cyber spying row turns spotlight back on
shadowy
Unit
61398,
REUTERS
(May
20,
2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/20/us-cybercrime-usa-china-unitidUSBREA4J08M20140520.
150
151
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tacks, espionage, or other related disruptions.156
As with APT28, direct ties between APT1 and PLA Unit
61398 are tenuous and largely circumstantial.157 Individual
Chinese perpetrators of cyber-espionage, however, appear to
have been less successful in hiding their identities than their
Russian, American, and Israeli counterparts. On the other
hand, attacks attributed to the Chinese appear to avoid choosing foreign sovereigns as targets, more content with attacks on
corporations or private firms a step removed from direct contact with a sovereign state. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to
conclude that China’s trepidation in seeking out such direct
contact means that its cyber unit or units would be any less capable in perpetrating a cyber-attack if it elected to pursue that
option.158
E. Analysis of Sovereign States’ Present Legal Liabilities
Cyber units created by sovereign States are a prelude to a
new dimension to combat support tactics executed through
cyber warfare. These sovereign States have envisioned both
defensive and offensive means of utilizing this ‘new front’ in
military operations. Certainly, they may possess the capability
to execute cyber operations that would constitute “acts or
threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread
terror among the civilian population” as defined in Article 51(2)
of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.159 Likewise, they appear capable of measures that are “reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or de156 Exec. Order No. 13694, 80 Fed. Reg. 18077 (Apr. 1, 2015) (“Blocking
the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious CyberEnabled Activities”).
157 Zeljka Zorz, More (circumstantial) findings reinforce Mandiant’s
APT1 claims, HELP NET SECURITY (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.netsecurity.org/secworld.php?id=14522.
158 See Ellen Nakashima, China testing cyber-attack capabilities, report
says,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
8,
2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/china-testing-cyberattack-capabilities-report-says/2012/03/07/gIQAcJwDyR_story.html (noting
Chinese cyber capabilities may rival those of the U.S.; reporting a statement
by James A. Lewis, a cyber-policy expert with the Center for Strategic and
International Studies: “if we get into any kind of a conflict with the PLA,
cyber will be their opening move.”).
159 A.P. I, supra note 38.
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struction to objects” under Rule 30 of the Tallinn Manual.160
While the question of attribution is a difficult one that likely
shields sovereign states from liability in most instances,161 this
paper’s analysis is confined to circumstances in which the international community successfully attributes an attack to a
state actor, and the “victim” state has captured the individuals
perpetrating that attack.
In such circumstances, the captives could be divided into
two broad categories: those who executed such attacks from an
openly designated military complex under a command structure, and those who did not. In cases involving “uniformed
armed forces,” “militias,” and “volunteer corps that form part of
those forces,”162 as is the case in some Israeli, American, and
Chinese forces focused on defensive tactics, the calculus is, in
theory, simple, provided members of those cyber-units are apprehended in uniform and at a designated military site.
The problem, however, is that cyber forces often operate
out-of-uniform and from numerous discrete locations.163 The

TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 106.
161 See id. at 34 (noting, at Rule 7, that “[t]he mere fact” that a cyber operation’s place of launch or origination is within “governmental cyber infrastructure” is insufficient to meet the standard for attribution); see also Larry
Greenemeier, Seeking Address: Why Cyber Attacks Are So Difficult to Trace
Back to Hackers, SCI. AM. (June 11, 2011),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/tracking-cyber-hackers/
(“The
hardest problem in finding the source of [cyber] attacks is attribution.”); Dimitar Kostadinov, The Attribution Problem in Cyber Attacks, Infosec Inst. (Feb.
1, 2013), http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/attribution-problem-in-cyberattacks/ (noting the consequences in the event of a hacker’s misidentification).
162 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 31, at art. 4.
163 See, e.g., James Stavardis, The New Triad, FOREIGN POLICY (June 20,
2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/20/the-new-triad/ (“A U.S. Cyber Force
will require a large civilian component and will need to be instinctively oriented toward working with the interagency process and the private sector”);
Christopher Paul, Isaac R. Porche III, and Elliot Axelband, THE OTHER QUIET
PROFESSIONALS: LESSONS FOR FUTURE CYBER FORCES FROM THE EVOLUTION OF
SPECIAL
FORCES,
Rand
Corp.,
at
27
(2014),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR700/RR780/
RAND_RR780.pdf (noting that cyber operations “are best satisfied with a
force that includes both uniformed and civilian personnel to appropriately execute given authorities, and many CNO functions can (and should) be carried
out from remote locations as part of reachback”).
160
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Geneva Conventions were meant to apply to partisan forces,164
not to the anonymities of warfare conducted over the internet.165 An issue more analogous to those conventions might
more reasonably arise concerning a ‘cyber-soldier’ or a ‘cyberpartisan’ who perpetrates a cyber-attack while operating behind enemy lines in a war zone. Assuming that the individual
is apprehended under the laws of war, the question would be
whether the apprehended perpetrator is a lawful combatant
under the Geneva Conventions. Certainly, the apprehending
state would argue that such an individual would fail to comply
with Article 4, Section 2 of the Third Geneva Convention if that
individual were out of uniform. That is, of course, unless the
individual operated in uniform and under orders while hiding
out in a forest and hacking via a satellite internet connection or
a local wi-fi signal. Under those circumstances, assuming the
cyber-soldier executed the attack in compliance with the laws
of war, in which case she might argue that her computer could
effectively be construed as an “openly displayed” armament,
particularly if she is otherwise unarmed. These unlikely circumstances, however, would constitute the only manner in
which such a cyber-combatant might successfully argue for the
applicability of the Geneva Conventions to her.
Even when operating within his own state, a cybercombatant’s rights under the Geneva Conventions are at best
unclear. Attacks perpetrated by the Stuxnet Worm, APT1, and
APT28 all appear to meet this model, at least in part. In these
cases, Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention poses serious
problems if the individuals carrying out the cyber-attack act
covertly, because such individuals might easily fall into the
ambit of Article 4, Section 2. Under that section, even individuals following “the laws and customs of war” within a distinct
command unit would have a difficult time proving that they
possessed “a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance,”
much less that they carried their arms openly; cyber164 See Commentary on Third Geneva Convention, supra note 43, at 52
(noting that in the course of World War II, an “abnormal and chaotic situation” arose “in which relations under international law became inextricably
confused”).
165 See Martin Libicki, Sub Rosa Cyber War 12-13 (noting marked differences between physical conflicts and those in cyberspace, particularly where
cyber-combatants are “sheltered . . . in the anonymity of the Internet”).
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combatants thrive on anonymity, and code in cyberspace does
not move through the battlefield with the openness of a kinetic
assault, such as a missile launcher or an M-16. Moreover, if
cyber units were to post their nation’s flag on the computer
screens of a hijacked site prior to an attack, they would lose the
element of surprise central to the effectiveness of attacks such
as that by Stuxnet on Natanz. The same would apply to cyber
units posting their code (the closest thing to their “arms” that
one can surmise in an electronic landscape) online prior to
launching a barrage of bits and bytes; it would only serve to
alert the enemy, which could then easily destroy that code or
render it ineffective before launching a counterattack of their
own against whatever sovereign nation had fired the opening
salvo.
It is of note that Mandiant’s data collection on PLA Unit
61398 managed to record aspects of the malicious code and to
decipher its contents.166 This assisted in determining the identities of the authors, sometimes as far back as 2004;167 it did
not assist in determining, under the standard required by the
Geneva Conventions, whether the authors flew a flag, wore
their military uniforms, or carried any form of “arms openly”
while they did so. The same analysis should apply equally to
the authors of Stuxnet or APT28’s activities. For these reasons,
the time is nigh for a new Protocol concerning cyber operations
perpetrated by sovereign state actors and their agents.
IV. The unique problem posed by non-state cyber forces
State actors have generally remained within the bounds (if
tenuously) of what reasonably constitutes cybercrime or cyber
espionage, rarely overreaching into the outright perpetration of
a cyber-attack.168 Non-state cyber units, in contrast, are far
166 APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, supra note
137, at 45-46 (attempting to identify PLA Unit 61398 hackers based on
metadata and code written by them).
167 Id. at 45.
168 See Benjamin Zweifach, Plugging the Gap: A Reconsideration of the
U.N. Charter’s Approach to Low-Gravity Warfare, 8 INTERCULTURAL HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 379, 420 (2013) ( “[O]ne state’s encouragement of a guerilla, nonstate movement would rarely rise to the level of an easily demonstrable Article 2(4) violation, simply by virtue of its less than kinetic conspicuousness . .
.”), citing Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
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more likely to possess the incentive to perpetrate activities rising to the level of a cyber-attack under international legal
standards.169 These groups, often already rogue in nature, may
not view themselves as bound by international law, or worse,
may not care.170 The most likely non-state actor to perpetrate
such a cyber-attack is ISIL, whose foray into the realm of cyber
warfare has resulted in several cognizable cyber operations
against sovereign states, including France and the United
States.171
Admittedly, whether one may successfully attribute a link
between ISIL and many groups professing loyalty to it is a tenuous gambit at best.172 Regardless, the dangers posed by ISIL
may be more acute than other organizations because of its embrace of modern technology and its appeal to young, computerliterate foreigners, including known hackers.173 At present,
ISIL hackers might find targeted, Stuxnet-style attacks that
bridge cyberspace and cause kinetic damage more challenging;
such attacks require time and resources not currently available
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (1986).
169 See Laurie R. Blank, International Law and Cyber Threats from NonState Actors, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 406, 407 (“The nature of today’s globalized and
interconnected world combined with the extensive reliance on technology,
computer systems and Internet connectivity means that non-State actors,
whether individuals or groups of some kind, can have a significant impact
through cyber activity.”).
170 See Scott Jasper and Scott Moreland, The Islamic State is a Hybrid
Threat: Why Does That Matter? SMALL WARS J. (Dec. 2, 2014),
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-islamic-state-is-a-hybrid-threat-whydoes-that-matter (noting ISIS’ disregard for international law).
171 See, e.g., Lizard Squad Twitter Feed, supra note 16; Newsweek is latest victim of the ‘Cybercaliphate,’ supra note 18; Martinez, supra note 20; Bill
Chappell, French TV Network Hacked By ‘Cyber Caliphate’ Group, NPR.org
(Apr.
9,
2015,
7:47
AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2015/04/09/398492643/french-network-tv5monde-is-hacked-by-cybercaliphate-group (reporting that France’s TV5Monde went blank, replaced by
the message ”Je suIS IS.”).
172 Nakashima, supra note 13; Chappell, supra note 170 (“It’s not yet
known what actual ties, if any, the [Cyber Caliphate] hackers might have to
ISIS.”).
173 Emma Graham-Harrison, Could Isis’s ‘cyber caliphate’ unleash a
deadly attack on key targets? Britain’s new spy chief has warned that we are
in a ‘technology arms race’ with terrorists recruiting an army of hackers to
their
cause,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
12,
2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/12/isis-cyber-caliphate-hackingtechnology-arms-race.
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to the group.174 Nevertheless, ISIL or another rogue fanatic
group bearing a similar desire for sovereign statehood would
find cyber warfare a tempting tactic for causing quick, highprofile damage to a stronger, more established adversary.175 In
the likely event that such an attack takes place in the future,
there are several distinct possibilities: first, the perpetrators
may be directly, indirectly, or loosely affiliated with the group
or unrecognized actor claiming statehood. There may also be
questions as to whether or not a conflict exists. International
Law would operate differently depending upon the nature of
the permutations outlined above.
A scenario that has the potential to cause widespread panic involves the internet of things. Take, for example, the
aforementioned scenario involving a cyber-attack on a military
base.176 Suppose, in the above scenario, a cyber unit that has
sworn allegiance to a group similar to ISIL infiltrates the ovens
at several military bases operated by the same sovereign state,
discharging the gas on each and turning on their pilot lights
several minutes thereafter. In an alternative scenario, the
cyber unit might simultaneously overheat all of the base’s furnaces overnight. Either situation causes a fire at the base, killing several hundred people. The hackers claim responsibility
after the attack two weeks later by placing a message and an
animated .gif file of their flag on the website of the company
that manufactures the devices.
The state invokes the right to self-defense,177 then invades
the region, capturing the hackers after tracking their IP addresses and internet footprint in a manner similar to that used
in Mandiant’s attempt to unmask PLA Unit 61398.178 At the
time of their capture, the hackers in the unit are operating in
Id.
See Oliver Rochford, Cyberwar: Breaching the Kinetic Barrier,
SECURITYWEEK (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.securityweek.com/cyberwarbreaching-kinetic-barrier. (“The risk of cyber-terrorism is of course far greater – religious and dogmatic fanatics and radicals may indeed wish to provoke
such a conflict. But we have to try and differentiate between that, and actual
nation-states taking potshots at another- activities with very little to gain in
real strategic terms, but which could very quickly escalate.”).
176 See Pesce, supra note 5.
177 U.N. Charter art. 51, supra note 65.
178 See APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, supra
note 137, at 45-46.
174
175
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uniform out of an unmarked building in territory seized by the
invading state. Aside from their computers, of course, they are
unarmed at the time of their capture. The invading state detains them as “unlawful combatants” in a temporary military
base in the occupied territory. The hacking unit’s commanding
officer claims that he and the members of his unit are properly
subject to treatment under the Geneva Conventions.
The analysis under the Third Geneva Convention is likely
to create more problems than solutions. For the purposes of
the proposed hypothetical, it can reasonably be assumed that
an attack on military bases would be permissible under the
laws of war, and thus the fourth prong of Article 4, section 2 of
the Third Geneva Convention is met. Since the hacking unit’s
detention occurred in territory within the group’s direct or effective control, the members of the unit perpetrating the attack
have a strong argument that they are “members of regular
armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.”179
The detaining state may attempt a counterargument, alleging that the manner in which the detained cyber-soldiers
carried out their attack was sufficient to render it covert.
Moreover, the detaining power may argue that the detainees
would fail to meet the standards enumerated in Article 4, subsection 2 of the Third Geneva Convention; the attackers have
not displayed any fixed signs recognizable at a distance, nor
have they carried their arms openly in effectuating their attack.180 The detainees may counter that recognizance at a distance is left “open to interpretation” and that posting their flag
on a related website meets the standard in Article 4, subsection

See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 31, at art. 4, sect. 3.
Id. at sec. 2. What “carrying arms openly” entails with respect to a
cyber-attack is anyone’s guess. See infra Part II (noting the significant issues
with respect to subsections (c) and (d) under Article 4, subsection 2 of the
Third Geneva Convention); but see Milord, supra note 123 (noting a “new
shoulder sleeve insignia” for a cyber protection unit). A physical insignia is
unlikely to meet the requirements of a “fixed sign recognizable at a distance,”
however. And regardless of whether the cyber-attackers adhere to the Geneva Conventions, the jus in bello may afford them no protection. See TALLINN
MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE, supra
note 32, at 97-98 (suggesting such fighters would be considered “unprivileged
belligerents” not subject to the Third Geneva Convention).
179
180

37

6 JAKE B SHER (DO NOT DELETE)

270

PACE INT’L L. REV.

8/10/2016 9:54 AM

[Vol. XX:N

2.181 The detaining state is likely to argue that the flag on the
website is insufficient to meet that standard, to which the detainees might respond by quoting Comment 11 to Rule 26 of
the Tallinn Manual, which states the opinion of some in the
group of experts that “the requirement only applies in circumstances in which the failure to have a fixed distinctive sign
might reasonably cause an attacker to be unable to distinguish
between civilians and combatants, thus placing civilians at
greater risk of mistaken attack.”182 Because the attack was
perpetrated solely against military targets, the detainees could
argue, they were justified in carrying it out, and thus a fixed
distinctive sign requirement does not apply.183
There will also be a question as to whether the “carrying
arms openly” standard is applicable to the detainees. The detainees may argue that their unit’s computers were used to
perpetrate the attack, and thus constitute “arms.” They may
refer to the Tallinn Manual, which states that the unit is effectively “‘armed’ if it has the capacity of undertaking cyberattacks” (Rule 30).184 However, the detaining state will argue
that the programs used in the cyber-attack are the “arms,” not
the computers, and it is thus impossible for the unit to have
carried a computer program “openly.” A question of prevailing
custom could arise, but because few cyber operations rise to the
level of a cyber-attack under international law, and there is no
consensus as to how a cyber-attack should be defined,185 neither side’s arguments are likely to prove entirely persuasive.
The detainees would argue that the element of surprise, at
least, is covered under existing law, and thus the openness of
the “arms” used in the cyber attack is subject to a figurative,
rather than a literal, interpretation.186 The detaining state
could attempt to counter this argument by suggesting that due
to the medium, the attackers were not reasonably recognizable
See Commentary on Third Geneva Convention, supra note 43, at 60.
TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 99.
183 See id.
184 Id. at 88.
185 Pool, supra note 10, at 309; see also Kodar, supra note 10, at 124.
186 Commentary on Third Geneva Convention, supra note 43, at 61 (noting that “openly” does not mean “visibly” or “ostensibly,” as “[s]urprise is a
factor in any war operation . . . “).
181
182
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in cyberspace at the time of the attack itself, whatever the nature of their actual weaponry.187 Regardless, the detainees may
have a strong argument that their international legal status is
in doubt. Thus, protection is warranted until a “competent tribunal” determines the detainees’ status.188 At that tribunal, a
fact-specific analysis about the nature of the detainees’ activities, the nature of their apprehension by the detaining power,
and the nature of the conflict between the detaining power and
the group to which the detainees belong is likely to become a
factor in determining the detainees’ ultimate classification.
In the above scenario, an indirectly or loosely affiliated actor would have a more difficult case. In such a scenario, the
question will be whether the actor’s affiliation with the detainee is strong enough to implicate that the detainee “belong[s] to
a party to the conflict.”189 Proving a connection may require
analysis under the standard in Nicaragua v. United States,
which held mere encouragement of an indirectly affiliated actor
insufficient to constitute a violation of the jus ad bellum on the
part of an encouraging state.190 On the other hand, “a role in
organi[z]ing, coordinating or planning the military actions of
the military group, in addition to financing, training and
equipping or providing operational support to that group” is
sufficient to result in that group’s liability under Prosecutor v.
Tadic.191 Even under the Tallinn Manual’s rules, loose affiliation may not be sufficient to shield the detainee from suffering
under unlawful combatant status; depending upon the nature
of their affiliation, the detaining power might term the detain-

Id. (“The enemy must be able to recognize partisans as combatants in
the same way as members of regular armed forces, whatever their weapons.”).
188 Id. at art. 5 (“Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having
committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy,
belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall
enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status
has been determined by a competent tribunal.”).
189 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 31, at art. 4, sec. 2.
190 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), supra note 168.
191 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
¶
137
(Appeals
Chamber,
ICTY,
Jul.
15,
1999),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf.
187
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ees mercenaries, to whom the Manual affords no protection.192
There a final wrinkle worth considering. Suppose that in
effectuating their attack, the detainees ‘accidentally’ acquired a
handful of IP addresses for ovens or furnaces that were civilian, not military, in nature.193 Suppose further that the resulting fires from those appliances caused widespread destruction
and civilian deaths in an urban center a thousand miles from
any of the unit’s military targets. The detaining state would
argue that the detainees violated Article 57(2)(a) of A.P. I,
which requires planners to “take all feasible precautions in the
choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding,
and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.”194 Thus, in
perpetrating this attack, the detainees violated the laws and
customs of war by targeting a civilian population. The detainees might attempt to counter that they had no intent to do so,
that any resulting damage was collateral in nature rather than
intentional, and that while “intentionally directing attacks
against civilian objects” constitutes a war crime in an international armed conflict, unintentional attacks do not.195
Here, the proportionality principle will likely apply. The
question will be whether the proper rubric for analysis should
be the proportional number of erroneously targeted IP addresses, or the proportional amount of damage caused to civilian
structures as a result of those erroneously targeted IP addresses. This is precisely the problem that existing treaty or custom
does not anticipate; it will likely be a matter of first impression
absent the establishment of some agreement or consensus regarding the issue.
Irrespective of what the outcomes in these scenarios might
be, the lack of governing law is troubling both for the detainees
and for the detaining state. Neither can be certain as to
192 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 103.
193 See Laurie Segall, My hack stole your credit card, CNNMONEY (Dec.
7, 2015, 3:38 PM ET), http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/06/technology/my-hackstole-your-credit-card/ (Recording the statement of a “grey hat” hacker:
“Sometimes when you compromise something, you have access to a lot of other things in that same IP address space.”).
194 A.P. I, supra note 38, at art. 57.
195 Rome Statute, supra note 78, at art. 8(2)(b)(ii).
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whether the Geneva Conventions will apply. This lack of a
clear demarcation of rights and responsibilities is a direct consequence of the lack of treaty, custom, or other prevailing authorities governing cyber conflicts; most arguments under international humanitarian law are persuasive, not binding,
upon the parties that first encounter each other in this new
arena.
V. Forward Into Cyberspace
The time is ripe for a new convention on cyber warfare, because cyber operations are now the norm.196 Without clear
rules of engagement, the impact on international humanitarian
law will be significant. Members of cyber units fighting on behalf of both state and non-state actors are equally unsafe, because what precisely their “arms” might be is presently unclear, much less whether such arms may be carried openly
when they conduct their operations against other sovereign
states. Moreover, what precisely would constitute affiliation
with a state or non-state actor under the Geneva Conventions
is a muddled question at best. A detaining state may argue
that the individuals perpetrating the attack were “lone wolf”
attackers, or only loosely affiliated; a detained cyber-soldier
may wish to bolster or deny his argument for connection with
the entity on whose behalf the detainee operated; and the entity who encouraged or ordered the cyber-attack may have strong
reasons to distance itself and disavow any connection. The result is a potential loophole in international humanitarian law
that detaining states may seek to use to their advantage.
At the time when the international community enacted the
Geneva Conventions, it faced a similar conundrum: how to deal
with the sorts of ragtag militias and partisan groups that resulted when previously sovereign states became occupied?197 It
196 See Jake Sher, A New UN Convention to Govern a New War Front?
PACE
INT’L
L.
REV.
BLOG
(Oct.
21,
2014),
http://pilr.blogs.law.pace.edu/2014/10/21/a-new-un-convention-to-govern-anew-war-front/; see also Walker, supra note 85 (quoting Atlantic Council
Board Director General Wesley Clark) (“We’re doing it all of the time. So is
everybody else; because, I hate to say this, you can’t wait ‘til the next war to
discover what the enemy’s cyber vulnerabilities are and what his nodes are.”).
197 See Commentary on Third Geneva Convention, supra note 43, at 49.
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chose to enact treaties that would protect those individuals,
provided they met certain standards. The international community faces a similar challenge in cyberspace today. If, as the
Third Geneva Convention’s drafters intended,198 it can use a
teleological approach to clarify the proper means by which
states must conduct cyber-attacks and operations, many of the
problems that an armed cyber-conflict poses could be brought
to easy resolution. To await the question is ill-advised.
The Tallinn Manual and most legal scholarship on the issue of humanitarian law in cyber-conflict have presented more
of a restatement of the present law than a true resolution.
However, the Tallinn Manual poses at least one potential solution to the issue of what carrying arms openly in cyber warfare
could mean. Read together, Rules 22 and 26 suggest that
members of the armed forces who are party to an “international
armed conflict” rescind entitlements to combatant immunity
and prisoner of war status when they fail to comply with the
requirements of combatant status in cyber operations.199 Thus,
the key to one’s status as a combatant may not be whether one
is in uniform; it could turn, rather, on whether one adheres to
the rules of engagement. Given the nature of cyber warfare,
this makes more sense than the present arrangement. It is
much easier to discern whether an individual has navigated
within accepted rules of jus in bello in cyberspace, because
their activities may be captured, tracked, or recorded using the
patterns of data executed by their activities.200
This legal standard would provide a strong enough evidentiary requirement to protect those who follow the rules of engagement, and to punish those who fail to do so. More importantly, however, the modern theater of war requires a
significant improvement to the convoluted analysis that would
apply at present under the Geneva Conventions. Absent a new
standard governing the law applicable to cyber-combatants, activities in the first cyber-conflict will likely be adjudicated in
the same manner as those of partisans were in the wake of the
See id. at 61.
TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE, supra note 32, at 79, 96.
200 See, e.g., Barbash, supra note 130 (noting the use of a predecessor
program to track such data).
198
199
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